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In his review of “situated cognition” Cheng reminds us that the properties of cognition 
can be influenced by much more than what is going on in the brain. In this commentary, I 
focus on the lessons that this situated approach can teach those of us using behavior as a 
tool for investigating animal cognition. Rather than just a measure telling us about hidden 
cognitive processes, the details of behavior can provide important clues about how animals 
are solving a task. By looking in more detail at the behavior of our animals, and the possible 
sensory consequences of these behaviors, we can not only learn more about how animals do 
what they need to do but also explore how situated cognition shapes the structure of behavior.
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Introduction: What’s the Point  
of  Situated Cognition?
As someone who has debated the value of embodied 
and extended cognition with my friends and colleagues, 
I found Cheng’s review of “situated cognition” incred-
ibly helpful. For most biologists and psychologists inter-
ested in understanding natural behavior, the useful-
ness of situated cognition depends on what it adds that 
current perspectives don’t. Does situated cognition get 
us closer to understanding how animals do what they 
need to do in nature?
Based on Cheng’s overview in his target article, I 
would say the answer to that question is yes. Situated 
cognition not only explicitly links animal cognition 
with ecology and morphology but also raises intriguing 
evolutionary questions. For example, are there limits to 
where and when distributed cognition can evolve, simi-
lar to those discussed in studies of altruism and euso-
ciality (Gardner & Grafen, 2009)? In this commentary, 
however, I focus on what I think situated cognition has 
to offer those of us who study animal cognition through 
behavioral experiments. In my opinion, situated cogni-
tion does more than just challenge our ideas about what 
counts as “cognitive”: It tells us that we could benefit 
from looking much more closely at behavior. 
Don’t We Already Look at Behavior?
Although traditional approaches to animal cognition 
have always measured behavior, I would argue that these 
measurements have been shaped by the assumed relation-
ship between cognition and behavior. Behavior is consid-
ered either an opportunity to learn, for example, in explo-
ration or information seeking, or an output of cognition. 
As a result, most experiments on animal cognition focus 
on the end points of behavior, such as where a bird digs 
(Kelly, Kamil, & Cheng, 2010) or which arm a rat runs 
down (M. F. Brown, 1992). These behaviors are thought 
to reflect “decisions,” and our experiments test the effect 
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of manipulations on these decisions. In my own research, 
for example, I have studied where a hummingbird probes 
for sucrose (Pritchard, Scott, Healy, & Hurly, 2016) 
and where a hummingbird stops when searching for a 
removed flower (Pritchard, Hurly, & Healy, 2015). In both 
cases, I have assumed that a decision to probe or hover is 
the result of the spatial cognition of the hummingbirds, 
and by measuring where these events take place, I can 
understand how that cognition operates.
Situated cognition challenges this assumption and 
suggests that by focusing on the end points of behav-
ior, we might be missing out on clues to how animals 
are actually solving these tasks. When choosing between 
two stimuli, for example, chickens follow repeated paths 
to the chosen object. Along this path, chickens make an 
idiosyncratic sequence of head movements, viewing the 
object with different parts of the eye at different points 
along their path. When the chickens are forced to take a 
different path, their ability to discriminate between the 
objects decreases (Dawkins & Woodington, 2000). By 
focusing only on the end points of the discrimination 
task, whether a chicken chooses the “correct” object or 
not, we would be missing an important part of how these 
birds were solving this task.
Detailed examinations of behavior are much more 
common in studies of navigating Hymenoptera. Since the 
1970s, studies of navigating bees, wasps, and ants have 
analyzed not only where an insect goes but also how she 
moves during navigation (e.g., T. S. Collett & Land, 1975). 
As a result, we now know that insects use specialized 
behaviors, such as learning flights and scanning head 
movements, to acquire and use visual information to 
navigate (M. Collett, Chittka, & Collett, 2013; Zeil, 2012). 
There are signs that a similar, descriptive approach to 
spatial cognition could be used to study “enactive” cogni-
tion in vertebrates. Birds, for example, also show promi-
nent head movements: Pigeons bob their heads (Green, 
Davies, & Thorpe, 1994; Troje & Frost, 2000), owls peer 
side to side (Ohayon, Van Der Willigen, Wagner, Kats-
man, & Rivlin, 2006; Van Der Willigen, Frost, & Wagner, 
2002), and terns scan scenes with different parts of their 
retina (Land, 1999). You only need to watch birds at a 
feeder in your garden to see that birds are constantly 
using behavior to shape what they see. Although insect 
navigation strategies have been presented as efficient 
solutions for animals with poor resolution vision and 
small brains (e.g., Chittka & Skorupski, 2017), I don’t see 
any reason why similar “enactive” strategies might not be 
used by birds, despite their larger brains and higher reso-
lution vision. Currently, however, we haven’t looked to 
see if this is the case. Studies of spatial cognition in birds 
have focused mostly on the end points of behavior, such 
as the location of digging or pecking, and much less on 
how birds reach these locations in the first place. If enac-
tive and extended cognition encourages more people to 
look more closely at the behavior of their animals, then 
these approaches are already adding something impor-
tant to our traditional approaches. 
Situated Cognition and Active Sensing
The “active” visual strategies of navigating insects 
and discriminating chickens highlight the role that 
“active sensing” could play in situated cognition. Active 
sensing involves animals using energy to sense their 
environment, either in terms of behavior (in the case of 
active vision or whisker movements) or by producing 
signals (e.g., echolocation or electroreception; Nelson & 
MacIver, 2006). By definition, active sensing informs an 
animal’s cognitive state (it is sensing, after all), but many 
examples of active sensing also show signs of being influ-
enced by an animal’s cognition. Rats will modify their 
whisker movements in anticipation of objects (Grant, 
Mitchinson, Fox, & Prescott, 2009), bats adjust the 
direction and structure of their echolocation calls based 
on their experience (Moss & Surlykke, 2010), and electric 
fish actively scan areas where they have previously found 
food (Jun, Longtin, & Maler, 2016). All of these exam-
ples potentially pass the mutual manipulability crite-
rion (MMC) as discussed by Cheng. As in the spiders 
of Japyassú and Laland (2017), these animals are using 
behavior not only to sense their environment but also to 
direct and focus their attention.
The line between active sensing and situated cogni-
tion can, however, be quite slippery. Barn owls, for exam-
ple, use “peering” head movements to assess distances 
before attacking prey (Ohayon et al., 2006). These 
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movements generate motion parallax and so provide 
owls with information about depth and distances, a form 
of active sensing. I suspect peering would also pass the 
MMC, although I don’t know if this has been tested 
directly. Barn owls can, however, also perceive depth 
using stereo vision and can use stereo vision to recognize 
distances they previously learned via head movements 
(Van Der Willigen et al., 2002). This would suggest that, 
once acquired, depth information is represented inde-
pendently of how it was perceived, which would seem 
to support the traditional Cartesian view. Even if peer-
ing was found to pass the MMC, it might therefore be 
difficult to classify peering as truly part of an enactive 
cognitive system. But does this matter? Under natu-
ral conditions, owls automatically make peering move-
ments when inspecting visual scenes and, indeed, had 
to be actively trained not to make peering movements 
in Van Der Willigen et al.’s (2002) experiments. Peering 
seems to have evolved as part of the package of mech-
anisms that owls use to inspect the world. Rather than 
drawing a hard line separating behaviors such as peer-
ing from “true” examples of situated cognition, it might 
be more productive to embrace the fact that cognition 
(like all biology) is a bit messy around the edges. Indeed, 
it might be in the gray areas between cognition, behav-
ior, perception, and morphology in which we discover 
the most interesting comparative data.  
Cognition and the Organization of Behavior
If an animal’s behavior is involved in processing 
information, then what consequences does this have for 
the evolution of behavior? Many unusual behaviors in 
animals function as a way to simplify sensory process-
ing. Head bobbing in birds, for example, reduces visual 
blur by restricting head movements to rapid thrusts 
forward (Necker, 2007), whereas flies restrict head rota-
tions to short saccades to better separate translational 
optic flow (which contains useful depth information) 
from rotational optic flow (which doesn’t; Hateren & 
Schilstra, 1999). If the need to process other information 
influences how an animal behaves, then we might expect 
to see a similar adaptation in the structure of behaviors 
used in enactive or extended cognition.
How would we identify the influence of cognition 
on the structure of behavior? In the case of vision, the 
sensory “consequences” of behavior can be worked 
out based on the function of the eye (Zeil, Boeddeker, 
& Hemmi, 2008). For cognition, however, the conse-
quences of behavior are likely to depend on the task 
that the animal faces. The “best” behavior for learning 
about space, for example, might look very different from 
the “best” behavior for learning about material proper-
ties, or for inspecting a conspecific. Instead, perhaps we 
could start by looking for any patterns in behavior at 
all. The computational analysis of behavior has recently 
become a hot topic in neuroscience and has resulted in 
a suite of computational methods to identify patterns 
in behavior (Anderson & Perona, 2014; A. E. Brown 
& de Bivort, 2017; Egnor & Branson, 2016). Although 
designed for computational neuroscience, these meth-
ods could provide a valuable new tool for comparative 
cognition researchers looking to broaden their measures 
of behavior. By identifying patterns in how animals 
behave during, for example, a spatial memory task, 
these computational methods could highlight candidate 
behaviors that could then be examined in more detail. 
In this manner, descriptive analyses of the structure of 
behavior could complement traditional experiments in 
comparative cognition and lead to a more integrative 
study of animal cognition.
Conclusion: Description and Diversity  
in Animal Cognition
One of my favorite aspects of the animal kingdom 
is its diversity, what Darwin (1859) referred to as its 
“endless forms most beautiful” (p. 490). By emphasiz-
ing the role that behavior, environment, and morphol-
ogy can play in cognitive processing, Cheng presents a 
version of animal cognition that embraces this diversity. 
Situated cognition does not just evolve through changes 
in the brain or via tweaks in the accuracy, capacity, or 
duration of general processes. Situated cognition could 
evolve and adapt through changes in bodies, or in behav-
ior, or even in social structure. At the beginning of one 
of the key early texts on embodied cognition, James J. 
Gibson (1979) wrote, “We are told that vision depends on 
the eye, which is connected to the brain. I shall suggest 
that natural vision depends on the eyes in the head on a 
body supported by the ground” (p. 1). Given the diver-
sity in senses, anatomy, ecology, and behavior seen in the 
animal kingdom, we might therefore expect that diver-
sity in cognition might be the norm.
A necessary step for those of us wishing to investi-
gate this situated cognition will be to look much closer 
at how animals are behaving, and how this changes 
during our experiments. This is not a new suggestion. 
One of the first sections of Tinbergen’s (1963) seminal 
“On Aims and Methods in Ethology” was on the need 
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for “Observation and Description.” But although Tinber-
gen’s four questions have been embraced by ecologi-
cally minded researchers in comparative cognition (e.g., 
B. Gibson & Kamil, 2009; Kamil, 1998), his warnings 
about the need for description and observation seem to 
have had less impact. The triumph of Tinbergen and the 
early ethologists was to expand animal behavior beyond 
the handful of model species studied in psychology labo-
ratories in order to include the diverse range of species 
and behaviors seen in the wild. Although comparative 
psychology today is very different to that faced by the 
early ethologists, Tinbergen’s (1963) warning about the 
danger of recording only behavior we consider relevant 
and overlooking “trivial” behavior still rings true: “We 
might forget that naïve, unsophisticated, or intuitively 
guided observation may open our eyes to new problems. 
Contempt for simple observation is a lethal trait in any 
science” (p. 412).
We are now living in a time in which computa-
tional approaches are revolutionizing how we can study 
behavior, providing tools that can capture, quantify, 
and analyze behavior like never before. Observation and 
description can now be carried out automatically and 
in incredible detail. But technology itself is not neces-
sary for looking closer at behavior. Studies of navigat-
ing insects have been using film and video to measure 
the details of behavior since the 1970s (T. S. Collett & 
Land, 1975). What is needed is a reason to look closer, 
and I think that situated cognition could provide one. 
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